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On wage formation, wage development and unemployment
H.M.M. Peeters and A.H.J. den Reijer
Since the mid nineties unemployment has substantially decreased in some EMU-countries. One
important factor underlying this development is wage moderation. This paper investigates wage
formation and wage development. Using a theoretical wage bargaining model main determinants of
formation are described, a non-linear wage equation is derived and estimated with annual or quarterly
data of the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland. The effects of the individual determinants on wages are
calculated and, in addition, each determinant’s contribution to the total wage developments is analysed
over the last three decades. It follows that each decade is characterised by few dominating
determinants. The contribution of unemployment has altered considerably.
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SAMENVATTING
Over loonvorming, loonontwikkeling en werkloosheid
H.M.M. Peeters en A.H.J. den Reijer
Sinds het midden van de jaren negentig is de werkloosheid in een aantal EMU-landen aanzienlijk
afgenomen. Eén belangrijke oorzaak voor deze ontwikkeling betreft loonmatiging. Dit artikel besteedt
aandacht aan de loonvorming en -ontwikkeling. Een theoretisch loononderhandelingsmodel is gebruikt
om de determinanten van loonvorming te beschrijven, een niet-lineaire loonvergelijking af te leiden en
te schatten met jaar- en kwartaalgegevens van Nederland, Spanje en Ierland. Aan de hand hiervan zijn
de effecten van de individuele determinanten op de loonontwikkeling berekend. In aanvulling hierop is
de bijdrage van elke loondeterminant in het totaal van de loonontwikkeling geanalyseerd gedurende de
laatste drie decennia. Uit de analyse volgt dat elk decennium kan worden gekarakteriseerd door slechts
een paar determinanten. De bijdrag van werkloosheid is aanzienlijk veranderd.
Trefwoorden: loonvorming, loonontwikkeling, werkloosheid
JEL codes: C22, E24, J30- 1 -
1  INTRODUCTION
Only a couple of years ago the huge, strongly increasing, domestic unemployment was a source of
concern for most European countries. Spain constituted the extreme upward peak. This country
experienced an average unemployment of 19.7% during the period 1983-1996 en reached a top of 23.7%
in 1994. Countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom reported
during this period high unemployment rates of about 10% (OECD, 1997).
In trying to explain this phenomenon of persistently high unemployment many comparisons with the
United States have been made. European labour markets are characterised in several studies as ‘rigid’ and
‘inflexible’. Unemployment has on average been much higher in Europe than in the US, a country facing
obviously less employee protection measures  1. Nickell (1997) rebutted this criticism in an extensive
study on the basis of different labour market criteria, emphasising the diversity of the European countries.
Unemployment during the period 1983-1996 had been on average lower in five of the fifteen European
Union countries than in the US. Moreover, the unemployment compensation payments had been more
generous in the US than for instance in Italy.
1 See e.g. Tables 1 and 4, p. 61, Nickell, 1997.- 2 -
For some European countries unemployment ‘persistence’ is no longer applicable since the mid nineties.
The unemployment rate has even fallen drastically with Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain outperforming
the other EMU-countries 2. As shown in graph 1, from 1993/1994 until 2000 the unemployment in the
three countries has declined 9.6 percentage points in Spain, 11.4 in Ireland and 5.2 in the Netherlands. For
the period 1995-2000 this boils down to an increase in employment of 2.2 million persons in Spain, over
400,000 in Ireland and nearly 1 million in the Netherlands. Despite its superior behaviour, Spain
experiences the highest number of unemployment persons within the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). Ireland and the Netherlands conversely seem to have reached the point of a tight labour
market, approaching nearly the case of ‘full employment’.
Table 1  Wage increase (%) due to a 1 percentage point decrease in unemployment
Short term
–––––––––––
Long term
–––––––––––
Ireland 0.80 1.82
Netherlands 0.66 2.28
Spain 0.17 1.21
Source: Layard, Nickell en Jackman (1991, Table 2, page 406).
The sharp reduction in unemployment provokes a positive effect on the economies. The question rises
however to what extent this reduction will upwardly influence wages, that might in the long term counter
the positive effects of additional employment creation. Moreover, wage rigidity seems downward more
rigid than upward. Different kinds of methods exists measuring this (real) wage rigidity. Layard, Nickel
and Jackman (1991) calculated for instance that the wage elasticities of the unemployment rate are
relatively low for the countries that we have under investigation here (see Table 1), but relatively high in
the long term. This fact implies that a change in the unemployment rate affects the wage formation mainly
in the long term.
This paper deals with these long-run wage elasticities. Furthermore, apart from unemployment, attention
is paid to other factors that determine wages. Various determinants of wage formation are discussed
according to a theoretical model from which a non-linear wage equation is derived, developed by
Graafland and Huizinga (1999). This model is estimated for the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland and the
2 Finland fits also in this list as Finnish unemployment declined from 1994 to 2000 by almost 7 percentage points. We have
however not included Finland in the analyses here.- 3 -
accompanying elasticities are calculated. The non-linear nature of the wage equation has the advantage
that the wage elasticities need not necessarily be constant. So, instead of the (constant) elasticities
presented in Table 1 according to Layard et al. (1991), this framework enables us to compute elasticities
that differ in time. We can therefore analyse specific changes that have been taking place during past
years. Moreover, we are able to quantify the partial contributions to the wage increase of the different
determinants. These calculations are performed over a sample of almost thirty years. Different
determinants turn out to be dominant during the different decades.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and the derivation of
the non-linear wage equation. Section 3 discusses the main wage determinants according to this model.
Section 4 to 6 report the estimation results. In section 4 this concerns the estimated wage equations for the
Netherlands and Spain. Section 5 thereafter goes into the details of the elasticities and section 6 into the
contributions of the determinants to the wage development. Section 7 finally provides background
information about the labour market policies during the last three decades in the three countries under
investigation. Section 8 summarises and concludes.- 4 -
2  THE WAGE BARGAINING PROCESS ACCORDING TO ECONOMIC THEORY:
A NON-LINEAR WAGE EQUATION
Literature describes the wage negotiation process in different ways. One of the most well-known
economic models is the Nash bargaining model that originates from game theory  3. The model
distinguishes on the one hand employers (organisations) and on the other hand employees (organisations)
or labour unions, wishing to reach an agreement on the employees’ wage. The model deals thus with two
‘players’, being ‘the’ employer and ‘the’ employee, who negotiate on equal terms on an ‘average’ wage.
During the negotiation process the gross wage is at stake. The players bargain and have a strict conflict of
interests. The employer´s aim is profit maximisation, while the employee aims at obtaining a net wage that
is as high as possible. The employee maximises the ‘utility’ that depends proportionally on this net wage.
A higher wage for the employee necessarily implies a lower profit for the employer and,  vice versa, a
higher profit can only be achieved by paying the employee a lower wage.
The wage, exclusive of sunk costs, is defined as the turnover per employee after deduction of the gross
wage of the employee. This can be written as
P q - W,                                                                                                                                                         (1)
where P is the value added price of production, q the production per employee (labour productivity) and
W the gross wage. The employee receives a net wage, so a gross wage after deduction of the taxes and
social contributions, t, paid by the employer as well as by the employee. The utility of the employee is
defined as the net wage in deviation of the reservation wage W,
W (1-t) - W.                                                                                                                                                   (2)
The reservation wage concerns the wage or benefit the employee would receive in case he would not fulfil
the job under consideration. This is a so called opportunity wage. The employee’s utility increases in case
the net wage W(1-t) increases or in case the reservation wage W decreases. The reservation wage is
3  See for a detailed description Graafland and Huizinga (1999). We thank them for providing their data and software. They
estimate with Dutch data the non-linear wage equation that results from the optimizing framework. They further examine the
effects of the average and marginal tax rates and the role of unemployment in interaction with the replacement rate.- 5 -
however not directly observable. It can be calculated as a kind of average earnings the employee would
receive in case of being employed elsewhere or in case of being without a job. Otherwise stated, these
cases concern having another paid job or being (in-)voluntarily unemployed. The reservation wage is
therefore a weighted average of the wage income in the official and the informal sector,
W = ß Wofficial + (1-ß) Winformal .                                                                                                                                                                                        (3)
The  parameter ß represents the fraction of the official wage in the reservation wage. Searching for a job -
in the official sector- may take some time, in particular in case of a loose labour market. During this
search period the unemployed receives no wage, but an unemployment or social benefit. A tight labour
market, on the contrary, raises the probability of finding a job. This probability can be assumed to equal
the fraction of unemployed persons in de labour force, say u. The unemployment rate u and the so called
replacement ratio R play a role in determining the wage of the official sector Wofficial, that is
Wofficial = u R W (1-t) + (1-u) W (1-t).                                                                                                          (4)
The wage in the official sector Wofficial equals W (1-t) in case of no unemployment (u=0) and, in case where
the unemployment rate would be 100% (i.e. u=1),  R W (1-t). These cases are evidently two extremes.
Usually the wage in the official sector will be somewhere in between. Wage W  is the gross average
‘market’ wage. The gross benefit received when unemployed equals R W  because the replacement rate R
equals the ‘average’ unemployment benefit divided by the average market wage. This replacement rate
plays an important part in this model. It can be seen as a sort of reduction in income in case a person,
instead of working, does not work.
The wage obtained in the unofficial sector can result from work done in the black market or saved
expenditures due to homework. Examples of the latter are savings due to child care, cleaning or house
(re-) decoration. It is assumed that productivity in the informal sector is linked to that of the official sector
because of spillovers of technological progress improving labour productivity in general. A parameter g
allows for a relatively low labour productivity of the informal vis-à-vis the official sector. Earnings in the
informal sector consisting of savings and/or expenses, represented as  Winformal, is further assumed
conditional on the consumer price Pc,
Winformal = g q Pc   where  g < 1.                                                                                                                    (5)- 6 -
The ‘optimal’ gross wage is derived from the wage bargaining model by maximising the combined
objectives of the employer and the employee, i.e.
W = (P q - W)
a (W (1-t)-W)
1-a                                                                                                                                                                                           (6)
where a  is a parameter representing the bargaining power of the employer. The higher this parameter, the
more power the employer has in comparison with the employee during the negotiation process.
After substitution of (1)-(5) into (6) and deriving the first order condition for optimality, the bargained
wage is derived as
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In the extreme case where the employer dominates the bargaining process, i.e. a=1, the employee is paid
just enough to keep him at work. In this case the employee receives the after tax reservation wage. In the
other extreme where the employee fully dominates the bargain, i.e. a=0, the employee’s wage equals the
total profits of the employer, that is the gross wage W is equal to Pq.
In order to derive an equation that can be estimated, by using the equilibrium condition W=W and some
rewriting, the resulting wage equation reads as
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The optimal gross wage (W) depends on a couple of factors: labour productivity (q), the sales price (P),
the consumer price (Pc), taxes and social contributions (t), the unemployment rate (u) and the replacement
rate (R). These six determinants will explain the wage rate to a large extent provided that the actual
bargaining process is specified appropriately by the model. The derived equation for the gross wage rate
can be considered as a long-term Nash equilibrium. In the short run the gross wage can deviate from this
equilibrium wage.- 7 -
3  MAIN DETERMINANTS IN WAGE FORMATION
According to the model the value added price and consumption price exert a positive and strong effect on
the wage rate in the long run. A 1% increase in the value added and consumption prices result eventually
in an increase of the wage rate with 1%. Mutatis mutandis an increase in the labour productivity has an
effect on the wage rate in the long run.
The wage effect of the wig, that is the difference between the wage that the employer pays and the wage
that the employee receives, is not unambiguously positive or negative. To analyse this effect, a further
distinction is to be made between the social security contribution paid by the employee, paid by the
employer, as well as the marginal and average tax burden for the employee. An increase in the average tax
burden will in general, given the marginal tax burden, result in a lower net wage. Such a decrease in the
net wage makes it more attractive not to work, strengthening the bargaining position of the employee and
for this reason eventually leading to a higher gross wage rate. The marginal tax rate influences the wage
ceteris paribus negatively. In case of an increase in de marginal tax rate it is no longer attractive to earn
additional money. This after all taxed more heavily. The employee therefore has an incentive to content
himself with a lower gross wage.
Important determinants in the wage formation are the  unemployment and the replacement rate that
influence the wage rate interactively according to the bargaining model. As explained before, the
replacement rate measures the financial distance between working and not working. A common definition
reads as
Replacement rate   =  
sector official   the   in   income   wage   net   average
benefit   nt unemployme   net   average
.
The definition of the replacement rate can vary. Sometimes ‘minimum’ instead of ‘average’ income and/or
social security benefit is used. Moreover, the replacement rate can be calculated for different groups of
unemployed, like short- and long-term unemployed, or different family compilations. The measurement of
the replacement rate is thus not unambiguous.
As working in the official sector will be more profitable than the social benefit for an unemployed person,
the replacement rate is smaller than one. It approaches one if there are hardly any differences between
working and not-working. It approaches zero if working is extremely profitable.- 8 -
Often the replacement rate is used to explain labour supply. If, for instance, working is made more
profitable compared to not-working, more persons outside the labour market will be inclined to start
looking for a job. The replacement rate reduces in this case and the labour supply rises. The effect of the
replacement rate on the labour supply is therefore negative.
Empirical evidence also shows that the replacement rate affects the wage rate. In contrast with the relation
with labour supply this relation is positive. The case of an increasing replacement rate, so a smaller
distance between working and not-working, will put an upward pressure on the wage rate in the long term.
The wage rate has in a sense to compensate for the difference in both situations. The smaller the distance,
the larger the wage compensation. In the extreme case where the distance is zero, so the replacement rate
equal to one, the employee has no financial incentive to work. He will require a wage compensation
before taking part in the paid labour process. A tight (loose) labour market will increase (decrease) the
denominator of the replacement rate. Shortage (abundance) of the work force exerts expectedly more
(less) pressure on the wage rate. This pressure will raise (lower) the average wage in the economy. The
numerator of the replacement rate on the other hand experiences more influence from changes in social
security, like unemployment benefits, other social security payments, taxes, social contributions, etceteras.
A higher unemployment rate exerts, as one may expect because of the higher demand for than supply of
paid jobs, a downward pressure on the wage rate. The effect of the unemployment rate on the wage rate is
thus negative. The extent of this effect depends on the replacement rate. The unemployment rate
moderates the wage rate most when unemployment is high and the replacement rate low. This situation is
a combination of a loose labour market where at the same time working is much more profitable than not
working. In this situation many people are involuntarily unemployed. The wage moderating effect of
unemployment will be higher as long as not working is less remunerative. In times of a relatively high
replacement rate that is almost equal to one, the difference between remuneration in case of working as
compared to non-working is by definition small. The replacement rate itself exerts a positive effect on the
wage rate. The reservation wage increases, which causes the employee to require a higher wage claim in
order to achieve his optimal level of utility. The effect on the wage rate depends at the same time, as stated
earlier, on the unemployment rate. So the unemployment and replacement rate interactively affect wages.
The formulated wage bargaining model tries to describe the wage formation suitably. The special feature
of the resulting wage equation concerns the non-linear character. As a consequence an identical alteration
in, for example, the unemployment rate affects the wage rate not necessarily to the same extent at different- 9 -
points in time. The (real) wage flexibility can thus change over time. These partial effects or elasticities
are calculated for all six determinants for a certain sample based on estimated parameters that appear in
the model. These are presented and discussed in the next section.
Some remarks are to be made concerning deficiencies of the model. One of the points is the constancy of
the negotiation power of the employer and employee, represented in the model as parameter a. Due to, for
instance, a tightening labour market a shift of the relative power position from employers to employees
may in reality take place. The specified model as such does not allow such shifts. A second remark is that
alternative factors relevant to the negotiation process, like working hours, refresher courses and other
secondary labour conditions, are not included. Moreover, institutional alterations and government
regulation affecting the labour market can exert influence on the bargaining process.- 10 -
4  ESTIMATION RESULTS
Equation (8) is estimated by non-linear least squares (NLS). A second estimation procedure is applied and
concerns applying NLS to the wage equation in an error-correction specification, formulated as
( )
*
1 1 log log log log - - - + D = D ￿ W W X W i i h f .            (9)
The first terms consider the short-term effects fi of the explanatory variables Xi. The term in brackets is
the error resulting from (8). Specification (9) allows for both long-term and short-term elasticities to be
estimated simultaneously. Table 2 presents the estimation results for both procedures for the Netherlands
and Spain. The coefficients of Ireland are calibrated at the Dutch equivalents.
Table 2  Estimation results
Netherlands
__________
Netherlands
__________
Spain
_____
Spain
_____
Long-term coefficients
a 0.93   (108.96) 0.92  (79.04) 0.87    (3.16) 0.79   (7.70)
b 0.96   (336.66)  0.96  (889.21)   0.77   (26.81) 0.86   (9.79)
g 0.86    (31.79)      0.86     (-) 
a) 0.78      (-)
 b) 0.78   (3.99)
q    -0.26     (3.14)     -0.22   (2.91)
Short-term coefficients
Dlog(w-1) 0.47   (2.87)
Dlog(q) 0.56   (6.25) 0.71   (2.56)
Dlog(P) 0.61   (3.20)
Dlog(Pc) 0.74   (4.34) 0.98   (3.15)
D(1-t) 0.79   (3.57)
h -0.41   (5.18)     -0.60   (4.10)
Sample period 1966-2000 1966-2000 1970.1-2000.4 1970.1-2000.4
Statistics
R
2
adj 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.91
Standard error(*100) 1.89 1.10 9.43 1.44
LM(2) 3.09 [p=0.06] 1.01 [p=0.38] 153.82 [p=0.00] 0.78 [p=0.48]
Jarque-Bera 0.30 [p=0.86] 1.59 [p=0.45] 2.70 [p=0.26] 8.13 [p=0.017]
a)  Unrestricted regression resulted in g=16.76  However, a Wald Test on the calibration of g  to it´s long run equivalent, g=0.86
resulted in a F-statistic of 0.014 [p=0.91]
b)  Unrestricted regression resulted in g=7.36  However, a Wald Test on the calibration of g  to it´s short run equivalent, g=0.78
resulted in a F-statistic of 0.0037 [p=0.95]
The results for the Netherlands and Spain in columns 1 and 3 concern equation (8) and the results in
columns 2 and 4 equation (9). For the Netherlands a dummy was included that equals 1 during the period
1995-2000 and zero elsewhere is included. The associated parameter is q. The rationale for this dummy
inclusion goes as follows.- 11 -
Estimation of the model over the period 1965-2000 as compared to the period 1966-1993 shows a shift in
the negotiating position of the employer in comparison with the employee. This implies a break in the
parameter  a as illustrated in Chart 2, showing estimates of the relative bargaining power based on
recursive regressions. The sample period consists in 1985 of 20 observations, namely the period 1966-
1985, and in 2000 of 35 observations (1966-2000). The dotted lines represent the 95%-confidence
interval. The sharp decline in the end nineties confirms that the employee’s influence has increased at the
expense of the employer. The precise dating of the dummy included in the wage equation in order to
capture this shift is determined by optimising the t-values belonging to the dummies starting at different
dates in the nineties.- 12 -
5  CALCULATED WAGE ELASTICITIES
The wage bargaining model explains the wage rate by the determinants. Both labour productivity and the
sum of the two prices possess a semi-elasticity of 1 by definition. More interesting cases are the
unemployment and the replacement rates. These semi-elasticities of these variables are plotted in Chart 3
together with the unemployment rates for the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland. The semi-elasticity of
unemployment in the Netherlands decreased from –1.5 during the second half of the seventies to –2.6
during the first half of the nineties. The same holds for Spain where unemployment semi-elasticity ranges
from –0.6 in the early seventies to –0.9 in the late nineties. In comparison with the Netherlands the
Spanish elasticities are relatively low (in absolute terms), similar to Layard et al. (1991, see Table 1).
These results confirm that the Dutch labour market is characterized as more flexible than the Spanish one.
Given the high unemployment rate in Spain, about 10 percentage points more than the Dutch rate, this
qualification seems plausible. Ireland’s unemployment semi-elasticities are relatively volatile and
fluctuate within a band of –5 and –3. So the pressure from unemployment on wages has changed more
over time and is higher in absolute values than in the Netherlands. This suggests that Ireland´s labour
market is both more flexible and more volatile than either the Dutch and the Spanish one. In accordance
with the Netherlands and Spain the Irish results show increasing elasticities (in absolute values) and so an
increasing upward wage flexibility during 1995-2000. For the three countries the elasticities (in absolute
terms) are declining during the seventies, they are relatively low during the eighties, and in the
Netherlands and Spain they are highest during the end nineties. Low semi-elasticities coincide with high
unemployment rates and vice versa, implying that wages are more reactive to unemployment in times
when unemployment figures are low. So, wages react asymmetrically with an upward tendency and
downward rigidity in case of respectively low and high unemployment.
The replacement rate is an interesting determinant because it reflects governmental policy decisions. The
semi-elasticity, i.e. the wage rate change as a result of a percentage point change in the replacement rate,
reflects in a sense the effectiveness of this policy. Chart 3 shows that the semi-elasticity of the
replacement rate varied for the Netherlands from 0.1 during the late sixties to 0.6 in the eighties. A top is
reached in 1983, the peak period where the unemployment rate was 11% or 600.000 persons. The
elasticity then declined to 0.2 in the nineties. Spain and Ireland show a similar pattern with both countries
showing lower elasticities, ranging from 0.05 to 0.25 and ending at 0.15. The pattern emerging from the
three countries is that of increasing elasticities in the seventies, high elasticities in the eighties and
declining ones in the nineties, but not reaching the lowest figures during the full sample. Government
policy was therefore most effective on the wage rate when the unemployment figures were highest.- 13 -- 14 -
6  ON WAGE FORMATION
According to the wage bargaining model the non-linear wage equation allows for time varying (semi-)
elasticities of the determining components, as calculated in the previous section. These elasticities hold in
the long term. They represent the cumulative effect during a long time period on the wage rate of a 1
percentage (point) change in the particular determinant. The actual changes in the determinants during the
sample are however also known. The total effect on the wage rate of each alteration in each determinant at
each period in time can thus be quantified. So, given the elasticity derived from the model and given the
change in a determinant, the total actual impact according the model on the wage can be computed. This
can be written in mathematical terms as a discrete time differential equation as
￿
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where ? W represents the percentage change of the variable W and ˛Wi is the semi-elasticity of variable i
with respect to W 4.
Equation (10) shows that in a particular year, the wage rise can be quantitatively decomposed into its
constituent parts. However, it needs to be stressed that the sum of the determinants’ parts in a particular
year represents the cumulative present and future effects on the wage rate according to the changes of the
determinants in that particular year. The observed realisation of the wage increase in a particular year
incorporates on the other hand the effects of present and past effects of determinants’ alterations.
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The decomposition of the wage increase into the determinants´ contributions, the total wage increase
according to the model and the observed wage increase over the past three decades are graphed in Chart 4
for respectively the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland5. The dotted line is the actual wage increase and the
solid line the calculated wage rise according to the model, that is the DW term on the left hand side of
equation (10). The seven bars display the determinants’ parts for every year, that is the right hand side of
equation (10). Note that some determinants have a negative impact on the wage formation, for instance the
unemployment increases, productivity declines during recession periods, etceteras. Interesting is the
changes in dominance of the determinants during the decades. The coming paragraphs will elaborate more
on characterising these decades.
During the seventies and early eighties all three countries show both high wage increases and high price
components indeed, reflecting the transmission of prices spiralling into wages. Since the early eighties the
price spikes show a huge decrease with spikes only half or one third as high. The total wage increase
according to the model corrected for by the price determinant has been remarkably constant in Spain,
seems to have increased in Ireland and decreased in the Netherlands. This gap is mainly filled by the
productivity determinant. Prices and productivity are in quantitative terms the most dominant determinants
over the whole sample for all three countries.
While inflation rates have been more controlled, the eighties are characterised by huge unemployment
rates and accompanying government policy to deal with these problems. In terms of our model this is
reflected in the replacement rate. In the eighties the policy activities of especially the Netherlands and
Spain can be seen in the wage determination. This follows from Chart 4 but even more clearly from Chart
5a showing the individual components. However, changes in the replacement rate do not seem to exert
much influence on the wage determination. The same pattern holds for the tax rate, although it exerts
slightly more influence than the replacement rate changes.
5 The Irish figures should be viewed cautiously because the Irish parameters are calibrated on the parameter estimates of the
Dutch equivalents.- 17 -- 18 -- 19 -- 20 -
Particularly interesting is the wage moderation policy in the Netherlands, established in the Wassenaar
treaty of 1982. Government, employers and employees agreed that productivity increases should be shared
in order to create employment. The capital’s share of GDP, as a measure of investment activity, increased.
Chart 5a shows indeed that productivity’s absolute contribution in the eighties and nineties is only half as
high as that of the seventies. This feature may reflect both a lower productivity rise and a lower share of
this rise showing up in wage increases. So, the eighties and early nineties show a lower wage increase due
to a lower price contribution in absence of huge inflation, negative replacement rate contributions
resulting from governmental policy actions and, in the Dutch case, due to lower productivity contributions
as agreed in the Wassenaar treaty.
While during the seventies, eighties and first half of the nineties the contributions of price increase and
productivity almost fully accounted for the total contribution, in the late nineties a third determinant is
becoming more prominent. Charts 4 and 5c show that for the first time in three decades unemployment
tends to put upward pressure on the wage rate over a sustained period. The charts show for all three
countries moreover a moderating influence on wages of unemployment in the recession periods, i.e. the
first oil crisis, the early eighties and the 1993/1994 period. The upward pressure on the wage rate of the
unemployment figures in the late nineties is a result of a tightening labour market and, in accordance,
rising elasticities (in absolute terms). Spain is however still facing high unemployment rates but has put a
lot of effort in liberalising and deregulating it’s labour market in the nineties. Small changes in the
unemployment rate will eventually show up more pronounced in the wage figures because of increasing
semi-elasticities of the unemployment rate with respect to the wage rate. Both the high elasticities and the
dominance of the unemployment determinant in the wage increase are novel features over the last thirty
year.- 21 -
7  ON WAGE DEVELOPMENT
This paragraph describes the institutional aspects of the three countries affecting the wage negotiation
process. A brief history of the evolution of these structures including the main events that shaped them is
presented for each country separately.
In the Netherlands 6 after the Second World War a guided wage policy started in order to quickly rebuild
the country and recover the economy. This lasted until 1963/64. Wages and prices were not allowed to
develop excessively. Wage agreements were approved by the government by the institution of the College
van Rijksbemiddelaars. In the beginning of the period, until 1954, the real wage was kept constant. This
policy was accompanied by a uniform nominal wage increase in accordance with inflation. Adaptation on
the industry level was not allowed. Since 1954 the labour income share, instead of the real wage, was kept
constant by equating the nominal wage increase to the price increase plus the labour productivity rise. In
1963/1964 this wage policy was no longer sustainable because of the tightened labour market. Market
forces took over guided wage policy and resulted in a wage explosion of 9% in 1963 and 14,9% in 1964.
This event together with all post-war events are presented in chart 6.
6 For full details on Dutch wage developments, see for example Van Veen (1996).- 22 -
Since 1964 collective wage agreements have been settled on industry level during free negotiations that
take place every 2 to 3 years. This feature brings the Netherlands at an intermediate position, between
totally centralised -by the government- and totally decentralised -on firm level- wage negotiations. The
government is allowed to intervene. The most prominent example of government advice has been in 1982,
known as the Wassenaar treaty. In this agreement employees agreed on wage moderation in exchange of
employment creation. The treaty has been established at the unprecedented peaking time of the
unemployment. This phenomenon was the result of the developments of the seventies, with the first oil
crisis in 1973, leading to a high inflation and consequently to considerable wage increases, and the second
oil crisis in 1979. This settled wage moderation lasted from 1983 until the late nineties. During the take
off to EMU, that started in 1999, severe criteria were imposed in accordance with the Maastricht criteria.
These concern the public debt, government deficit, exchange rate and inflation. Being one of the candidate
members of EMU, the Netherlands experienced the consequences. The development of inflation
mitigated. This together with the moderated wage development led to a balanced real wage increase since
the mid nineties.
Wage formation in Spain is essentially performed by collective bargaining. There are two main labour
unions in Spain that are organised both over economic sectors and regional lines. Sectoral agreements are
generally applicable on provincial level, being part of a whole region. Agreements can be applied to a
whole region, more than one region or even the whole country. The agreements determine wage
developments of different professional groups. The conditions are legally binding for all employees in the
concerning economic and geographical domain and profession, independent of labour union membership.
Labour union power does not express itself in high membership rates of the unions but in the total amount
of employees subjected to the collective agreements. Employer’s organisations are organised along similar
lines as the unions and are represented by a national umbrella.
The collective bargaining process is legally settled already in the Franco regime in 1958 known as
‘Ordenanzas laborales’. The sectoral structure of the unions, originating from the dictatorial episode, had
undergone remarkably little alterations since the democracy take off in 1977. The call for more equality
after the dictatorship fall down might be the cause of the reduction in wage inequality. The resulting wage
equalisation is characteristic for the mid seventies in Spain. During the first half of the eighties the
Spanish unemployment rate rose dramatically, from 11% in 1980 to over 20% in 1985. A couple of
developments can be mentioned that potentially have influenced the wage formation. Contrary to the
declining union power in the Anglo-Saxon countries in the Spanish case this power magnified. Wage
bargaining institutions were more forcefully legitimised by law with the ratification of the so called- 23 -
employee constitution. The main consequence was the creation of law concerning employee protection
resulting for the employer in excessive employee dismissal costs.
The rigid labour market institutions started to show an increasingly worse fit in structural adjustments
caused by the opening of the economy. The openness of the Spanish economy increased considerably
when Spain joined the European Union in 1986. The decline of the agricultural share in the Spanish
economy coincided with the restructuring process of the industrial sector in the aftermath of the oil shock
in 1979. In the mid eighties both factors caused turbulence at the labour market, declining employment
and correspondingly high unemployment figures. After 1986 the employment recovered because of EU
membership, the cyclical state of the European economy and a series of reforms. Since 1984
unemployment figures have not been lower than 15%. This caused ongoing attempts to reform.
A short overview is as follows.
•  1984: abandoning the restrictions on temporary labour contracts. Companies were enabled to hire
people without being confronted with the extensive labour protection and accompanying excessive
dismissal costs.
•  1994: broadening of the scope of legitimate massive dismissals and encompassing of organisational
and production related motives.
•  1997: reaching stable employment and improving the collective bargaining process. Temporary labour
contracts harm the long term relationship between the employer and employee and consequently the
accumulation of firm specific human capital. Stable employment is encouraged by the introduction of
permanent contracts with reduced protection. The negotiation process was intended to be improved by
bargaining on a more decentralised level (regional or firm specific) as the resulting wages better reflect the
specific labour market conditions.
Partly because of the latest reforms and the moderated wage development over 1 million jobs have been
created in 1998 and 1999. The creation shows up in the unemployment rate reduction from 19.6% to
15.5% in the end of 1999.
In Ireland unemployment steadily declined to a level of 4.2% in 2000, coming from the most recent peak
of 15.7% in 1993. The long term unemployment -more than a year- has moreover substantially fallen to a
level of 1.4% in the end of 2000. The percentage long term unemployed of 0.5 in 1997 remains far beyond
the OECD-average of 0.33 but is however approaching the EU average. With such low unemployment
figures labour force shortages increasingly become the bottleneck of continuing economic growth.- 24 -
As a consequence of the strong economic growth and resilient expectations employment has risen by 4%
yearly from 1994 until 1997 and by almost 7% in 1998. This rise is mainly accounted for by the
construction sector (23.5%) and the private services sector (14.6%), while a sluggish but significant
growth is observed in the industrial sector. Employment in the public sector has remained constant, apart
from a modest jump in the fall of 1998. The strong demand for labour reduced unemployment, while also
attracting newcomers on the labour market. About three quarters of the employment creation between
1995 en 1998 was fulfilled by an increase in the working population and the remaining quarter by
unemployment reduction. Growth of the labour force accelerated form a annual 2% during the period
1993-1995 to a 3% ever since. Domestic demographic factors explain a stable 1.25%. The other source is
the rising labour participation mainly of women, explaining roughly 1%. The women participation fraction
approaches with 0.47 the EU average, but stays far below the 0.65 of the UK. A second source is net
immigration becoming positive in 1996 and rising to 0.6 percentage point in 1998. The elasticity of labour
supply is indeed very high which is a special privilege of Ireland.
With respect to issues like exclusion and poverty the government has introduced a minimum wage. The
OECD (1999) expresses however doubts on the instrumental value of the minimum wage for these
specific targets. Income distribution affairs are best dealt with by fiscal, social and tax policies, while the
labour market´s only goal is the efficiently assigning of jobs and individuals. Given the introduction of the
minimum wage the effects on poverty fighting depends on the level of this wage. The introduction of a
minimum of two thirds of the median wage of a full time employee resulted in the highest relative
minimum wage in the OECD.
Since 1987 a social consensus model has been the basis of the wage formation. The core of the model is to
combine moderate gross wage increases with tax wage decreases resulting in substantial higher after tax
net wages. This model was implemented against a background of high unemployment and gradually
deteriorating public finances. The desirability of this strategy is being discussed in the current situation of
a severe shortage in the labour force. Ireland could for instance reduce the excessive competitive capacity
by a real appreciation of the currency, that can only be achieved in a monetary union by price and wage
increases higher than the competitors ones. The government warned however against an overshooting of
prices and wages potentially leading to an Irish hard landing scenario.
The resulting and currently existent agreement of the social partners is the ‘Programme for Prosperity and
Fairness’ (PPF) and covers the period 2000-2002 and consists agreements over a broad range of subjects:
social activation, promotion of a dynamical economy, full employment, the information society, balanced- 25 -
and sustained development and modernisation of the public sector. The agreement moreover emphasises
the vital importance of the international competitiveness as a precondition for ongoing economic and
social progress. The agreement is however not legally binding for the employers and employees in the
private sector. It is expected to put forward a standard.
Extreme tight labour market conditions and the higher than expected inflation caused additional wage
increases on top of the settled ones resulting from the PPF. In 2000 a wage increase of 5.5% was agreed
under these conditions, while the realisation reached levels of 7.5% for the industrial sector and 7.6% for
the services sector.
In the nineties the wage agreements of the social partners contributed considerably to the economic
performance but their functioning under the condition of full employment and as an instrument to control
inflation remains uncertain. In 2000 wages in the private sector already increased faster than agreed in the
PPF and surveys show this trend to continue. Moreover the public sector exerts pressure for wage
equalisation compared to the private sector. A decrease in the wage taxes results, even if wages will
develop as agreed, to an increase in total demand that, ceteris paribus, results consequently even in a
small open economy with inflationary pressure.- 26 -
8  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A non-linear wage equation is derived from a theoretical framework describing the wage bargaining
process between employers and employees. The wage rate is determined by labour productivity, the value
added price and the consumer price, the marginal and average tax rates and further, interrelatedly, the
unemployment and replacement rates. This wage equation is estimated using annual and quarterly time
series of the last three decades of the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland. In comparison with the study of
Graafland and Huizinga (1999), who developed this wage bargaining model and estimated the wage
equation for the Netherlands up to 1993, main attention is paid here to the end nineties where
unemployment sharply dropped. Additionally, the contributions of the wage determinants are computed
and assessed during the full sample period.
The nice feature of the model concerns the wage determinants´elasticities that are allowed to differ over
time. The wage semi-elasticity with respect to unemployment, for instance, depends on the unemployment
rate, the replacement rate, the tax rates and the estimated structural parameters. Higher (lower)
unemployment leads, ceteris paribus, to a lower (higher) wage rate. Moreover, our model provides a tool
to measure the reactivity of the wages due to unemployment over time. Empirical results show that low
unemployment figures match with high semi-elasticities (in absolute values), that is highly reactive wage
developments. Our calculations show an upward tendency and downward rigidity of wage development in
case of respectively low and high unemployment.
Main empirical results are the following. In the Netherlands a shift in the bargaining power of the
employers to the employees is found. This is captured in the wage equation by allowing for a parameter
shift, which according to tests, takes place in 1995. Then unemployment elasticties (in absolute terms) are
highest in Ireland and lowest in Spain. The Netherlands take an intermediate position in this case. Over the
whole sample period, labour markets in Ireland and the Netherlands were more reactive to unemployment
in comparison with Spain. Relatively higher reactivity of wages to labour demand and supply conditions
reflects a better functioning labour market. During the three decades the unemployment elasticities are (in
absolute terms) at the highest at the end of the nineties in all three countries. The corresponding upward
pressure on wages is caused by the decline in unemployment and seems to be a result of strongly
improved job market position of employees.
Furthermore the contributions of each of the individual wage determinants to the wage developments are
computed over the three decades. It follows that in the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland prices exerted much- 27 -
upward pressure on wages in the seventies. In the eighties governmental regulatory activities affecting the
labour market show up as pushing the wage increase downward. In comparison with the seventies and
eighties, the nineties are very different. During the beginning or mid nineties considerable changes took
place in labour markets entailing lower unemployment rates and therefore a more dominant upward
impact of unemployment on wage development. This unparalleled turning point in the Netherlands, Spain
and Ireland was probably due to the favourable combination of the labour market policy conducted in the
eighties and the bright economic climate starting in the beginning or mid nineties.- 28 -
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